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Abstract
High-performance anti-spoofing models for automatic speaker
verification (ASV), have been widely used to protect ASV
by identifying and filtering spoofing audio that is deliberately
generated by text-to-speech, voice conversion, audio replay,
etc. However, it has been shown that high-performance anti-
spoofing models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Ad-
versarial attacks, that are indistinguishable from original data
but result in the incorrect predictions, are dangerous for anti-
spoofing models and not in dispute we should detect them at
any cost. To explore this issue, we proposed to employ Mock-
ingjay, a self-supervised learning based model, to protect anti-
spoofing models against adversarial attacks in the black-box
scenario. Self-supervised learning models are effective in im-
proving downstream task performance like phone classification
or ASR. However, their effect in defense for adversarial attacks
has not been explored yet. In this work, we explore the robust-
ness of self-supervised learned high-level representations by us-
ing them in the defense against adversarial attacks. A layerwise
noise to signal ratio (LNSR) is proposed to quantize and mea-
sure the effectiveness of deep models in countering adversar-
ial noise. Experimental results on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset
demonstrate that high-level representations extracted by Mock-
ingjay can prevent the transferability of adversarial examples,
and successfully counter black-box attacks.
Index Terms: adversarial attack, black-box attack, anti-
spoofing, ASV, self-supervised learning
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification, abbreviated as ASV, is the task
to verify whether a piece of speech sample belongs to a cer-
tain speaker. Thanks to the efforts of previous researchers [37–
41], it is now a matured technology widely applied to biomet-
ric identification. However, evidence shows that unprotected
ASV models are highly vulnerable to spoofing audio deliber-
ately generated by text-to-speech, voice conversion, and audio
replay [42, 43], as some malicious attackers mimic a specific
target user to deceive the ASV systems. As a result, strategies
to handle the spoofing audio are in need. The ASVspoof chal-
lenge series [44–46] is a community-driven challenge to arouse
attention in addressing spoofing audio attacks and their coun-
termeasures. Spoofing countermeasure models, also known as
anti-spoofing models, are shields for ASV to detect and fil-
ter spoofing audio. Recently several high performance anti-
spoofing models have been proposed [47–56].
Since Szegedy et al. [57] first proposed the concept of ad-
versarial attacks, and illustrate how deep neural networks with
impressive performance for computer vision tasks are vulner-
able to adversarial attacks, a large variety of research in this
domain have been done. Adversarial example, which is gener-
ated by adding imperceptible perturbation to the input sample,
can result in the incorrect prediction of the models. The added
perturbation is carefully crafted such that humans can not distin-
guish the adversarial example from the input sample visually or
acoustically. Attacking the models with adversarial examples is
called adversarial attack. Previous works show that deep neural
networks for speech processing tasks are subject to adversarial
attacks. [58] investigates the vulnerability of automatic speech
recognition (ASR) models to adversarial attacks. Given any au-
dio waveform, whether speech or music, they can generate an
adversarial example, which is over 99% similar to the origi-
nal audio but makes the ASR model wrongly predict any tran-
scribes they defined before. It has also been shown that ASV
systems can be fooled by adversarial examples [59, 60]. More-
over, in [61, 62], the authors illustrate the anti-spoofing models
for ASV systems are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In
this paper, we focus on the defense for adversarial attacks of the
anti-spoofing models.
Proactive defense and passive defense are two main cate-
gories of defense for the adversarial attacks. The former de-
fense aims to train new models to counter the adversarial at-
tacks. The most famous proactive defense method is adversarial
training [63], which injects the adversarial examples generated
by different attack algorithms into the training data. It is rea-
sonable that the models are robust to specific attack algorithms
if the models have already seen the adversarial examples dur-
ing training. However, adversarial training is time-consuming
and resource-consuming. Whats more, when defenders do ad-
versarial training, they have no idea which attack algorithm the
attackers will take. The mismatch between attack algorithms
during training and inference will make the models susceptible
to adversarial attacks they havent seen during training. Passive
defense methods embrace the advantage of defending adversar-
ial examples generated by all kinds of attacking methods with-
out modifying the model. The spatial smoothing, also called
as filter, is a passive defense method that counters adversarial
attacks [64]. Gaussian filter, median filter and mean filter are
used to defend anti-spoofing models in [61]. The above three
filters are shallow filters to counter the deliberately generated
adversarial perturbations.
In this paper, we propose a passive defense leveraging the
power of self-supervised learning. Self-supervised learning al-
lows the model to learn high-level and contextualized represen-
tations from a large amount of unlabeled data, without the use
of any label [65]. In self-supervised learning, a pre-training
task (or auxiliary task) that uses only unlabeled data is formu-
lated, and the model is required to solve such a task. While
solving the pre-training task, the model is also learning a func-
tion that maps input to high-level representations, which can
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Figure 1: (a) Adversarial attack, (b) Proposed method, (c) Illustration of the self-supervised Mockingjay pre-training.
potentially transfer information learned from unlabeled data to
downstream tasks. Through pre-training models on speech,
self-supervised learning based models are able to leverage the
knowledge of unlabeled speech, then the performance of down-
stream speech and language processing (SLP) tasks can be im-
proved dramatically [66–69], including phone classification,
speaker recognition, and speech recognition. However, the ro-
bustness of such high-level audio representations learned by
self-supervised learning based models against adversarial at-
tacks for anti-spoofing of ASV have not been studied yet.
In this work, we find that self-supervised learning models
can serve as a deep filter which extracts the pivotal information
from the contaminated input spectrograms to counter the adver-
sarial attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we are among the
first ones to adopt the high-level representations extracted by
the self-supervised model for the defense of anti-spoofing mod-
els in the black-box scenario and the experimental results show
the effectiveness of our proposed method. We also propose the
layerwise noise to signal ratio (LNSR), to quantize and measure
the effect of deep models in countering adversarial noise. We
find that the adversarial noise is attenuated layer by layer in the
self-supervised learning model.
2. Adversarial attack
When a tiny perturbation, which is imperceptible to humans,
is deliberately crafted and added to the original example, the
new example will lead to the model’s incorrect prediction. We
call the new example and the tiny perturbation as adversarial
example and adversarial noise respectively.
As shown in Figure 1 a), x is the original example, δ is
the adversarial noise and x˜ is the adversarial example. Given
the anti-spoofing model f(.), we denote the prediction of the
original example and adversarial example as f(x) and f(x˜).
The adversarial example is generated as this equation:
x˜ = x+ δ. (1)
Finding an adversarial example is equivalent to crafting a suit-
able perturbation δ and searching for a suitable δ is an optimiza-
tion problem as shown below:
max‖δ‖∞≤Diff(f(x), f(x˜)), (2)
where Diff(f(x), f(x˜)) means the difference between f(x)
and f(x˜) and it is totally differentiable, ‖δ‖∞ is the L∞ norm,
 is a constant we defined to constrain δ. We solve the opti-
mization problem by doing gradient descent to the input with
the model parameters fixed. We want the adversarial example x
to be as similar as x˜ to make them indistinguishable by human,
so the noise δ shouldn’t be too large. In this paper, δ is con-
strained in an L∞ norm ball. Different searching strategies for
δ result in different attack algorithms. In this paper, we adopted
the fast gradient-sign method (FGSM) [63] and the projected
gradient descent method (PGD) [70].
There are two kinds of adversarial attack scenarios: black-
box attack and white-box attack. In both two scenarios, there
are two models: the target model and the attacking model. The
target model is the model attackers aim to attack, and the attack-
ing model is the model implemented by the attackers to gen-
erate adversarial examples. In the black-box attack scenario,
the target model and the attacking model are different mod-
els, while in the white-box attack scenario, the target model
is also the attacking model. In the white-box attack scenario,
the attackers know everything about the target model, including
model parameters, gradients, etc. Obviously it is unrealistic that
the attackers have all access to the target model. In the black-
box scenario, the attackers can’t obtain the inner parameters of
the target model, while they can collect the inputs and the out-
puts of the target model by querying it. Then the attackers will
train a substitute model and employ the substitute as the attack-
ing model to generate adversarial samples with transferability.
Our objective in this paper is to prevent the transferability of
such adversarial examples, and improve the robustness of anti-
spoofing models against black-box attacks by leveraging high-
level representations extracted by self-supervised models.
3. Proposed method
3.1. Mockingjay
The Mockingjay [66] approach learns representations of speech
by solving a self-supervised masked-prediction task with a L1
reconstruction loss function. The model is based on multi-layer
transformer encoders with multi-head self-attention [71] fol-
lowed by a feed forward prediction network. The transformer
encoder produces a representation vector for each time frame,
and the prediction network reconstructs frames of spectrogram
to solve the masked-prediction task. At training time, the
masked-prediction task requires the model to take a sequence
of frames as input that has had a certain percentage of ran-
domly selected frames masked, and attempts to reconstruct the
masked frames. After training, the representations produced by
the transformer network are inputs to the anti-spoofing model
instead of acoustic features. We illustrate this in Figure 1 b).
We consider a masking policy following [65, 66]. The fol-
lowing three cases are sampled. Case A) we mask all selected
frames to zero; this happens for 80% of the time. Case B) we
replace all selected frames with random frames, 10% of the
time. And Case C) we leave all the selected frames untouched
for the rest 10% of the time. Then the sampled case (A, B,
or C) would be applied on 15% of randomly selected frames.
The intuition is that by reconstructing from corrupted input, the
model should learn a solid understanding of the high-level con-
tent, which provides immunity to adversarial attacks. To adapt
the local smoothness of acoustic sequence, we mask contiguous
segments of Cnum of frames. We illustrate this in Figure 1 c),
where we show an example of Cnum = 3. We also employ
the downsampling technique from [66], where we reshape and
stack Rfactor consecutive frames into one step.
3.2. Self-Supervised Learned Adversarial Defender
In this work, we propose to adopt the Mockingjay to pro-
tect the anti-spoofing models. Superficial or surface features
like Mel-Spectrogram often buries the abundant information of
speech, extracting representations with the Mockingjay trans-
form thus makes the high-level information more accessible to
downstream tasks. We first extract the high-level representa-
tions from spectrograms by Mockingjay and then use the high-
level features to train the anti-spoofing model. The cascade of
the Mockingjay and anti-spoofing model shown in Figure 1 b)
is called self-supervised learned adversarial defender.
In the black-box attack scenario, the attackers are not aware
of the existence of the Mockingjay and only know the inputs
to the target system are spectrograms. They attempt to nd ad-
versarial noise to add it to the input spectrograms by using the
attacking model. However, before the input spectrograms are
thrown into the anti-spoofing model, the Mockingjay will help
alleviate the superficial noise added to the input spectrograms
and avoid the transferability of adversarial noise. Experimen-
tal results show that the high-level representation extracted by
Mockingjay prevents the transferability of adversarial noise and
counter the black-box attacks.
The readers may challenge the power of defense here comes
from the mismatch of the network architecture between the tar-
get and attacking model. The target model has the Mockingjay
as the front-end, while the attacking model does not. It may
be intuitive that the attack signal for the attacking model can-
not transfer to the target model. However, experimental results
show that pre-training plays a critical role in the defense. With-
out the pre-training, merely using the mismatch of network ar-
chitecture can not avoid adversarial noise’s transferability.
There are two plausible reasons that the Mockingjay can
help counter the adversarial noise. From the perspective of
the self-supervised training procedure of the Mockingjay, the
masked-prediction task introduces noise to the input spectro-
grams. The Mockingjay is trained to learn how to weaken
the noise in the input spectrograms, extract pivotal information
from the contaminated spectrograms, and use the pivotal infor-
mation to reconstruct the original clean spectrograms. The ad-
versarial noise is also a kind of noise to some extent. So in our
proposed approach, the Mockingjay would weaken the adver-
sarial noise added to the input spectrograms, extract key infor-
mation and pass the key information to the anti-spoofing model
to finish the anti-spoofing task. From the loss function perspec-
tive, in the black-box attack scenario, usually the target model
and the attacking model perform the same task and are trained
by classification loss. It is intuitively the adversarial perturba-
tions generated by the attacking model are with transferability
to the target model as they are both sensitive to classification
loss. However, in the proposed approach, the Mockingjay is
trained by reconstruction loss and performs the task which is
different from the attacking model.
3.3. Layerwise noise to signal ratio
We propose a measurement named layerwise noise to signal ra-
tio (LNSR) in order to estimate the intensity of adversarial
noise in different layers of the Mockingjay:
LNSRi =
N∑
n=1
‖hˆni − hni ‖2
‖hni ‖2
for i = 0, 1, . . . ,K,
(3)
where K is the total layer number of the Mockingjay, N is
the number of the adversarial example - original example pairs,
‖.‖2 means L2 norm, hˆni and hni are the features of the ith layer
of the adversarial example and original example respectively for
the nth pair. When i = 0, hˆni and h
n
i are the adversarial exam-
ple and original example themselves. LNSRi aims to measure
the amount of the attack signals in each layer. If the value of
LNSRi decreases when i increases, that means Mockingjay
attenuates the attacking noises.
4. Experiment
4.1. Experiment setup
For the dataset, we use the LA partition of the ASVspoof
2019 challenge, which contains fake audios generated by text
to speech and voice conversion. The dataset is itself divided
into three parts: training, development, and evaluation.
For the Mockingjay, we use the prevailing framework of the
LARGE model described in Mockingjay [66], which consists of
12 layers of Transformer Encoders. We follow the pre-training
settings as in [66], where we pre-train our Mockingjay model on
360 hours of speech on the LibriSpeech dataset [72]. Two high-
performance anti-spoofing models are adopted: LCNN [55] and
SENet [56]. The implementation details of the two models can
be found in [62]. We refer to the LCNN and SENet trained by
the mel-spectrograms as basic LCNN and SENet. In the black-
box attack scenario, we use the basic LCNN and SENet as the
attacking models to generate adversarial examples and use the
models in Figure 2 as target models. The adversarial examples
generated by the basic LCNN are used to attack the basic SENet
and its variants. The adversarial examples generated by the ba-
sic SENet are used to attack the basic LCNN and its variants.
We use FGSM and PGD as attack algorithms, and we measure
over different values of : 0.1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16.
Figure 2: Comparison of different defense methods against two attack algorithms over increasing amount of attack signal .
Figure 3: Layerwise noise to signal ratio on Mockingjay
4.2. Result and analysis
4.2.1. Comparing different defense approaches
The proposed approach is compared with various passive filter-
based defense approaches [61]. Results are presented in Fig-
ure 2. We refer to the cascade of the pre-trained Mockingjay
and anti-spoofing model as Mock, the basic LCNN or SENet
as Mel, and finally the anti-spoofing models equipped with dif-
ferent hand-designed filters as medium, mean, and Gaussian. In
Figure 2 A) and B), LCNN and its variants are attacked by PGD
and FGSM, respectively. In Figure 2 C) and D), SENet and its
variants are attacked by PGD and FGSM, respectively.
As expected, basic Mel models (grey curve) are vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. In all four scenarios, we see the pro-
posed Mockingjay defense mechanism prevails over all other
approaches (red curve, denoted as Mock), as Mockingjay is in-
variant to adversarial attacks. The attack always fails no mat-
ter the amount of attack signal. Although Mockingjay is pre-
trained on LibriSpeech [72] but not ASVspoof data, it is still
capable of leveraging self-supervised learned knowledge to de-
fense adversarial attacks. Other filters (medium, mean, and
Gaussian) also counter the attack to some extent, but cannot
resist high values of  as Mockingjay. The Mockingjay model
outperforms all the filters in all circumstances.
Moreover, we show results of a random parameterized
Mockingjay (orange curve, denoted as rand) to demonstrate
the effect of pre-training. Random parameterized Mockingjay
also shows some capability of defense in Figure 2 A) and B),
but fails to protect anti-spoofing models against adversarial at-
tacks as  increases. It completely fails to protect anti-spoofing
models in Figure 2 C) and D). The results show that the ran-
dom Mockingjay is much worse than the pre-trained model, and
even worse than the hand-designed filters in some cases. This
shows that our success in the red curve (Mock) is not simply
from the mismatch of network architecture between the target
model and attacking model. To further show the importance of
pre-training, we trained the anti-spoofing models with the same
architecture as the cascade of Mockingjay and LCNN/SENet
from scratch. The results are denoted as “scratch” (dark blue
dot). The results show that training the cascade model from
scratch results in a low accuracy that barely surpasses random
guesses. This further shows that the success in the red curve
(Mock) is not contributed by model size.
4.2.2. Measuring the removal of adversarial noise
The values of LNSR (Section 3.3) in different layers of differ-
ent models are shown in Figure 3. rand-PGD and mock-PGD
means we use the adversarial examples generated by PGD with
 to calculate the LNSR on the random parameterized Mock-
ingjay and pre-trained Mockingjay, respectively. Two  values
are tested: 8, 16. From Figure 3, the pre-trained Mocking-
jay successfully lowers the LNSR. When the model becomes
deeper, the value of LNSR becomes lower, which illustrates
the effect of the Mockingjay to alleviate the adversarial noise.
In contrast, the random parameterized Mockingjay can only re-
duce LNSR to a certain degree. When model depth increases,
the value of LNSR is quickly saturated. This is another evi-
dence to show the importance of pre-training in defense.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we propose to use a self-supervised learning model
to protect the anti-spoofing models against black-box attacks.
Experimental results illustrate the representations extracted by
self-supervised learning model prevent the transferability of ad-
versarial examples and counter the black-box attacks. The pro-
posed layerwise noise to signal ratio manifests the effectiveness
of the self-supervised learning model in alleviating the adversar-
ial noise layer by layer. For the future work, we would like to
explore the capability of defense for the self-supervised model
learned with different objectives and apply the proposed defense
approaches on more speech processing applications.
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